• Fixed Water Sharing Agreements Sustainable to Drought (with Ariel Dinar and Daene McKinney)

• Prices vs Quantities with Multiple Pollutants (with Jessica Coria)

• Spatial Efficiency of Genetically Modified and Organic Crops (with Corinne Langinier and Philippe Marcoul)

• Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle (with Lars Ehlers)

• The Porter Hypothesis at 20: Can Environmental Regulation Enhance Innovation and Competitiveness? (with Mark A. Cohen, Stewart Elgie and Paul Lanoie)

• Regulatory instruments to protect the commons: An experimental investigation (with Alexis Garapin, Laurent Muller, Arnaud Reynaud and Carine Sebi)

• Electricity production with intermittent sources of energy (with Claude Crampes) forthcoming in Resource and Energy Economics

• Regulation of a Spatial Externality: Refuges versus Tax for Managing Pest Resistance (with Marion Desquilbet) Environmental and Resource Economics 2012, 51(1):79-104

• The distributional impact of common-pool resource regulations (with Carine Sebi) Indian Growth and Development Review 2011, 4(2): 123-141

• Environment policy, innovation and performance: New insights on the Porter hypothesis (with Paul Lanoie, Jeremy Laurent-Lucchetti and Nick Johnstone) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 2011, 20(3): 803-841.

• Fair intergenerational sharing of a natural resource (with Hippolyte d'Albis) Mathematical Social Science 2010, 59(2): 170-183

• When and why does it pay to be green? (with Paul Lanoie) Academy of Management Perspectives 2008, 23: 45-62

• Cooperation and equity in the river sharing problem (with Lars Ehlers) in Game Theory and Policy Making in Natural Resources and the Environment Edited by Ariel Dinar et al., Routledge Publishers 2008.

• Sharing a river among satiable countries (with Lars Ehlers) Games and Economic Behavior 2008, 64:35-50.

• Sharing a common resource with concave benefits Social Choice and Welfare 2008, 31, 1–13.

• Incentive to reduce crop trait durability (with Corinne Langiner and Stephane Lemarie) American Journal of Agricultural Economics 2008, 90(2), 379-391.

• Voting over informal risk-sharing rules Journal of African Economies 2008 17: 635-659.

• Roscas as financial agreements to cope with self-control problems (with Nicolas Treich) Journal of Development Economics 2007, 82(1), 120-137.

• Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 137(1), 733-744.

• Fees or refuges: which is better for the sustainable management of insect resistance to transgenic Bt corn? (with C. Vacher, D. Bourguet, M. Desquilbet, S. Lemarié, and M. Hochberg Biology Letters, 2006, 2(2), 198-202.

• Can environmental regulations be good for business? An assessment of the Porter hypothesis (with Philippe Barla) Review of Energy Studies 2006, 14(2), 42-62.

• On the redistributive impacts of privatizing a resource under imperfect enforcement (with Louis Hotte) Environment and Development Economics 2006, 11(6), 1-20.

• Decentralizing hydropower production (with Joseph Doucet) Canadian Journal of Economics, 2003, 36(3), 587-607.

• A theoretical foundation to the Porter hypothesis (with Philippe Barla), Economic Letters, 2002, 75(3), 355-360.

• Sharing a river (with Yves Sprumont), Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 107(2), 453-462.

Réguler pour contrôler le développement de la résistance aux pesticides : La question de la durabilité des pesticides et des variétés résistantes à des bioagresseurs (avec Marion Desquilbet) INRA Sciences Sociales n.2/3, 2011

Performance environnementale et économique de l'entreprise (avec Paul Lanoie) Economie & Prévision 2009, 190-191:71-94.